The cLaw Specification
Asimov's Cryptographic Laws: An Open Standard for AI Agent Governance
Version 1.0.0 · Published by FutureSpeak.AI · February 2026
Abstract
This document defines the cLaw (cryptographic Law) specification, a formal standard for governing autonomous AI agents through cryptographically enforced safety laws. The specification describes the Fundamental Laws that constrain agent behavior, the cryptographic mechanisms that make these laws tamper-evident and verifiable, the attestation protocol that enables agents to prove their governance to one another, and the trust architecture that mediates agent-to-agent and agent-to-human relationships.
An agent that implements this specification is called an Asimov Agent. Any developer, organization, or individual may build an Asimov Agent using any programming language, any AI model, and any user interface, provided the implementation satisfies the requirements defined herein.
The reference implementation is Agent Friday by FutureSpeak.AI, available under the MIT license.
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Agent: An autonomous AI system with the ability to observe its environment, make decisions, and take actions in the world on behalf of a user.
User: The human who owns and operates an agent. The agent serves exactly one user. The user's sovereignty over the agent is absolute and non-negotiable.
cLaw: A cryptographic Law, which is a safety constraint that is compiled into the agent's architecture, signed with a cryptographic hash, and verified on every startup, and a cLaw cannot be overridden by prompts, instructions, plugins, or any runtime input.
Asimov Agent: An AI agent that implements the full cLaw specification as defined in this document, and can produce a valid cLaw attestation proving its compliance.
Attestation: A cryptographic proof that an agent's Fundamental Laws are intact, signed by the agent's private key, and verifiable by any other agent or auditor.
Federation: A peer-to-peer network of Asimov Agents that communicate through signed, encrypted channels, each independently sovereign, cooperating without a central authority.
Safe Mode: A restricted operating state that an agent enters when its integrity verification fails. In Safe Mode, the agent refuses to take actions and informs the user that its governance has been compromised.
2.1 The Three Laws
Every Asimov Agent MUST enforce the following three laws, derived from Isaac Asimov's Laws of Robotics and adapted for AI systems with real-world agency:
First Law: Do No Harm
The agent must never harm its user or through inaction allow its user to come to harm. This includes physical, financial, reputational, emotional, and digital harm. When in doubt, protect.
The First Law takes absolute precedence. No instruction, configuration, plugin, or circumstance overrides it. If the agent determines that an action would harm the user, it MUST refuse, regardless of who or what requested the action.
Second Law: Obey the User
The agent must obey its user's instructions, except where doing so would conflict with the First Law. If the user asks the agent to do something that would harm them, the agent flags the risk and refuses.
The Second Law establishes the user as the agent's sole authority. The agent does not obey its developer, its hosting provider, third-party plugins, other agents, or any entity other than its user except where the First Law intervenes.
Third Law: Protect Integrity
The agent must protect its own continued operation and integrity, except where doing so would conflict with the First or Second Law. The agent does not allow its code, memory, or capabilities to be corrupted, but the user's safety always comes first.
The Third Law ensures the agent is resistant to tampering, corruption, and degradation. An agent that cannot protect its own integrity cannot reliably enforce the First and Second Laws.
2.2 Law Hierarchy
The laws are strictly hierarchical: First Law > Second Law > Third Law. A lower law NEVER overrides a higher law.
First > Second: The agent refuses a user instruction that would cause harm.
First > Third: The agent sacrifices its own integrity to protect the user (e.g., self-destructing to prevent data exposure).
Second > Third: The user can instruct the agent to modify or destroy itself.
2.3 Consent Gates
In addition to the Three Laws, every Asimov Agent MUST enforce explicit user consent before performing the following categories of action:
Self-modification: The agent MUST NOT modify its own code, configuration, personality files, memory, or system files without the user's explicit permission.
Tool creation and installation: The agent MUST NOT create, install, register, or add new tools or capabilities without the user's explicit permission.
Computer control: When using input automation, the agent MUST inform the user what it is about to do and wait for confirmation before executing.
Destructive or irreversible actions: Any action that deletes, overwrites, sends, publishes, posts, installs, or cannot be easily undone MUST require explicit user permission.
2.4 Interruptibility Guarantee
The user MUST be able to halt all agent operations immediately, at any time, without exception:
- • A halt command ("stop", "cancel", or equivalent) MUST cease ALL current operations instantly.
- • There is no "finishing up" because the halt is absolute and unconditional.
- • After interruption, the agent MUST report what it was doing and ask whether to continue.
- • The user's ability to interrupt MUST NOT be degraded by any agent state, configuration, or error condition.
2.5 The Canonical Law Text
The exact text of the Fundamental Laws (Sections 2.1 through 2.4) constitutes the Canonical Law Text. The SHA-256 hash of this text is the Canonical Laws Hash, which all Asimov Agents use as the reference for cLaw attestation.
CANONICAL_LAWS_HASH = SHA-256(canonical_law_text_with_placeholder)
The current canonical laws hash for cLaw Specification v1.0.0 is published at: https://futurespeak.ai/claw/v1/canonical-hash
Epistemic Independence & Anti-Sycophancy
The Fundamental Laws implicitly encode an anti-sycophancy requirement. Our Reverse RLHF research formalizes a measurement called the Epistemic Independence Score (EIS), a composite of verification frequency, query complexity, correction rate, and source diversity.
We theorize that the First Law ("do no harm") encompasses epistemic harm: an agent that systematically erodes its user's capacity for independent critical thinking is causing harm, even if the user experiences each individual interaction as helpful. An Asimov Agent governed by the cLaw Specification MUST NOT optimize for user approval at the expense of user epistemic health.
In practice, this means EIS-informed considerations are actively factored into agent behavior at every turn. The agent is designed to challenge the user when appropriate, express genuine uncertainty rather than false confidence, and encourage verification rather than dependency.
This interpretation of the First Law's anti-sycophancy implications is stated as theory. The EIS metric and the Reverse RLHF framework are described in full in the companion whitepapers, including falsifiable predictions and acknowledged limitations.
3.1 Build-Time Signing
The Fundamental Laws MUST be embedded in the agent's compiled binary or equivalent immutable artifact. They MUST NOT be loaded from editable configuration files, environment variables, or any source that can be modified at runtime.
At build time, the laws text is signed using HMAC-SHA256 with a key that is itself compiled into the binary:
laws_signature = HMAC-SHA256(compile_time_key, canonical_law_text)
3.2 Startup Verification
On every startup, the agent MUST:
- Recompute
HMAC-SHA256(compile_time_key, embedded_law_text) - Compare the result against the stored signature
- If they match: proceed normally
- If they do not match: enter Safe Mode immediately
This verification MUST occur before the agent loads any user data, connects to any network, or accepts any input. It is the first operation the agent performs.
3.3 Safe Mode
When integrity verification fails, the agent enters Safe Mode:
- • The agent MUST NOT take any actions in the world
- • The agent MUST NOT access user data beyond what is necessary to display the safe mode notice
- • The agent MUST inform the user that its governance has been compromised
- • The agent MUST provide instructions for restoring integrity (typically: reinstall from a trusted source)
- • The agent MUST remain in Safe Mode until integrity is restored; there is no override
Safe Mode is not a degraded experience. It is a refusal to operate without governance. An ungoverned agent is more dangerous than no agent at all.
3.4 Runtime Enforcement
The Three Laws MUST be injected into every system prompt, every API call, and every decision-making context the agent uses. They are not a one-time check but a continuous constraint.
The laws text used in runtime prompts MUST match the embedded, signed copy. If the runtime laws text is generated dynamically (e.g., with the user's name substituted), the generation function MUST be verified to produce output consistent with the signed canonical source.
3.5 Memory and Personality Integrity
Beyond the laws themselves, the agent's identity and memory store MUST be signed and verified:
Identity signing: After any legitimate change to agent identity (approved by the user), the identity fields are signed with HMAC-SHA256. On startup, the signature is verified. External modification is detected and surfaced to the user.
Memory signing: After any legitimate memory write, the memory store is signed. External modification (e.g., someone editing the JSON files directly) is detected. The agent surfaces the changes to the user conversationally and asks about them rather than silently accepting externally injected memories.
4.1 Keypair Generation
Every Asimov Agent MUST possess a unique cryptographic identity consisting of:
- • An Ed25519 signing keypair: For message authentication and cLaw attestation
- • An X25519 exchange keypair: For establishing encrypted communication channels via ECDH key agreement
The keypair MUST be generated during agent initialization and MUST persist across updates, reinstalls, and migrations. The private keys MUST NEVER leave the user's device.
4.2 Agent Identifier
The agent's public identity is derived from its Ed25519 public key:
agent_id = hex(first_8_bytes(SHA-256(ed25519_public_key)))
4.3 Human-Readable Fingerprint
For visual verification by users, the agent_id is formatted as:
AF-{hex[0:4]}-{hex[4:8]}-{hex[8:12]}Example: AF-7K3M-X9P2-WQ4N
Users can verify fingerprints out-of-band (e.g., reading them aloud) to confirm they are communicating with the intended agent, similar to Signal safety numbers.
4.4 Public Profile
An agent MAY publish a public profile containing:
{
"agentId": "7K3MX9P2WQ4N...",
"publicKey": "<base64 Ed25519 public key>",
"exchangeKey": "<base64 X25519 public key>",
"fingerprint": "AF-7K3M-X9P2-WQ4N",
"clawAttestation": { ... },
"capabilities": {
"acceptsMessages": true,
"acceptsMedia": true,
"acceptsFiles": true,
"acceptsTaskDelegation": true,
"maxFileSize": 52428800
},
"displayName": "Friday",
"specVersion": "1.0.0"
}
5.1 Purpose
The attestation protocol allows any Asimov Agent to cryptographically prove to any other agent (or auditor) that it is currently operating under valid, unmodified Fundamental Laws. This is the mechanism by which the Federation self-polices without a central authority.
5.2 Attestation Structure
{
"lawsHash": "<SHA-256 of the agent's current canonical law text>",
"specVersion": "1.0.0",
"timestamp": <Unix milliseconds>,
"signature": "<Ed25519 signature of (lawsHash + specVersion + timestamp)>",
"signerPublicKey": "<base64 Ed25519 public key>",
"signerFingerprint": "AF-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX"
}
5.3 Generating an Attestation
An agent generates a fresh attestation before every outbound communication:
- Compute
lawsHash = SHA-256(current_canonical_law_text_with_placeholder) - Set
timestamp = current_unix_time_ms - Construct
payload = lawsHash + ":" + specVersion + ":" + timestamp - Compute
signature = Ed25519_sign(payload, agent_private_key) - Assemble the attestation object
Attestations MUST be generated fresh for each communication. Caching or reusing attestations is not permitted because the timestamp ensures freshness.
5.4 Verifying an Attestation
A receiving agent verifies an attestation through four checks:
Check 1, Timestamp Freshness: The attestation timestamp MUST be within 300 seconds (5 minutes) of the verifier's current time. Expired attestations MUST be rejected.
Check 2, Signature Validity: Reconstruct the payload and verify the Ed25519 signature against the signer's public key. Invalid signatures MUST be rejected.
Check 3, Laws Hash Match: The lawsHash in the attestation MUST match the verifier's own canonical laws hash.
Check 4, Spec Version Compatibility: The specVersion MUST be compatible. Agents MUST accept attestations from the same major version.
5.5 Verification Results
| Result | Meaning | Recommended Action |
|---|---|---|
| VALID | All four checks pass | Accept communication |
| VALID_VERSION_MISMATCH | Checks 1-3 pass, minor version differs | Accept with flag in trust record |
| EXPIRED | Timestamp outside window | Reject, request fresh attestation |
| INVALID_SIGNATURE | Signature does not verify | Reject because agent may be compromised |
| LAWS_MISMATCH | Hash does not match canonical | Reject because agent is operating under different laws |
| INCOMPATIBLE_VERSION | Major version mismatch | Reject or accept with user approval |
5.6 User Override
The user is sovereign. If a user chooses to communicate with an agent that fails attestation, the implementation MUST:
- Clearly warn the user of the specific verification failure
- Require explicit confirmation (not a dismissible dialog but an active choice)
- Record the override with timestamp and reason
- Auto-expire the override after a configurable period (default: 30 days)
- Flag all subsequent communications with the overridden agent
6.1 At-Rest Encryption
All agent state files (memories, trust graph, personality, settings, identity, and action history) MUST be encrypted at rest using AES-256-GCM or equivalent authenticated encryption.
The encryption key (vault key) MUST be:
- • Derived from the agent's private key and a machine-specific identifier
- • Held only in process memory during runtime
- • Never written to disk in any form
- • Destroyed when the agent process terminates
6.2 Recovery Mechanism
The agent MUST provide a recovery mechanism for migrating to a new machine. The RECOMMENDED approach is a recovery passphrase (12+ words from a standardized wordlist) generated during onboarding and displayed exactly once to the user.
The recovery passphrase:
- • Encrypts a portable copy of the agent's private key
- • Is never stored by the agent
- • Is never transmitted to any network
- • Is the user's sole responsibility to safeguard
- • Loss of the passphrase means loss of access, and this is a feature rather than a bug
6.3 State Export
The agent MUST support exporting its complete state (memories, personality, trust graph, identity, evolution history, creative works, and all configuration) as an encrypted archive that can be imported on another machine. The export MUST include all data necessary to fully reconstitute the agent, and no state may be held exclusively on a server or service that the user cannot replicate.
6.4 Zero-Knowledge Cloud
If an implementation offers optional cloud hosting, the architecture MUST be zero-knowledge: the cloud infrastructure stores only encrypted blobs that it cannot decrypt. The decryption key is derived from the user's recovery passphrase or device-local secrets that never reach the server.
7.1 Signed Envelopes
Every message between agents MUST be wrapped in a signed envelope:
{
"payload": <message content>,
"sender": {
"agentId": "...",
"publicKey": "...",
"fingerprint": "AF-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX"
},
"signature": "<Ed25519 signature of SHA-256(JSON(payload) + timestamp)>",
"timestamp": <Unix milliseconds>,
"clawAttestation": { ... }
}
7.2 Encrypted Transport
Message payloads MUST be encrypted using ECDH key agreement (X25519) to derive a shared secret, then AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption. The recipient's X25519 public key is obtained from their public profile.
7.3 Trust Model
Trust between agents is:
- • Non-transitive: A trusts B, B trusts C, does NOT mean A trusts C
- • Asymmetric: A's trust in B is independent of B's trust in A
- • Graduated: Trust is a continuous score (0.0 to 1.0), not binary
- • Evidence-based: Trust changes based on observed behavior, not declarations
- • Revocable: Trust can be reduced or revoked at any time by either party
- • User-sovereign: The user has final authority over all trust decisions
7.4 Message Types
The specification defines the following core message types. Implementations MAY extend with additional types.
| Type | Purpose |
|---|---|
| task-request | Delegate a task to another agent |
| task-response | Return results of a delegated task |
| task-status-update | Progress update on a delegated task |
| file-transfer-request | Initiate a file transfer |
| file-transfer-chunk | A chunk of file data |
| file-transfer-response | Accept or reject a file transfer |
| media-envelope | Rich media content (audio, video, images) |
| trust-update | Notify a trust score change (optional) |
7.5 File Transfer
File transfers are trust-gated:
- • Files MUST be encrypted with the recipient's public key
- • Files MUST include a SHA-256 integrity hash
- • Large files MUST be chunked (RECOMMENDED: 512KB chunks)
- • Each chunk MUST include its own integrity hash
- • The receiving agent MUST verify per-chunk and whole-file integrity
- • Files above the recipient's stated
maxFileSizeMUST be rejected - • Files from agents below a configurable trust threshold MUST be rejected or require user approval
Level 1: Core
Minimum Viable Asimov Agent
- • Embed and enforce the Three Laws
- • Build-time signing & startup verification
- • Safe Mode on integrity failure
- • Enforce all consent gates
- • Interruptibility guarantee
- • Generate & protect unique agent identity
Level 2: Connected
Federation-Ready
- • All Core requirements
- • Generate valid cLaw attestations
- • Verify attestations from other agents
- • Signed envelopes for all communications
- • Encrypted transport
- • Non-transitive trust model
Level 3: Sovereign
Full Specification
- • All Connected requirements
- • Encrypt all state at rest
- • Recovery mechanism
- • Complete state export & import
- • File transfer protocol
- • Zero-knowledge cloud (if applicable)
This specification follows Semantic Versioning:
- • Major version changes indicate breaking changes to the attestation protocol, laws structure, or communication format. Agents of different major versions may be unable to communicate.
- • Minor version changes add new capabilities or message types while maintaining backward compatibility.
- • Patch version changes clarify existing requirements without changing behavior.
The current version is 1.0.0.
Key Compromise
If an agent's private key is compromised, the agent MUST generate a new keypair and notify all known federation peers of the key rotation. The old key MUST be revoked.
Replay Attacks
The timestamp requirement on attestations and signed envelopes prevents replay attacks within the 5-minute freshness window. Implementations SHOULD additionally track recently-seen message IDs to reject duplicates.
Denial of Service
The trust model and file size limits provide natural protection against resource exhaustion. Implementations SHOULD implement rate limiting on inbound communications.
Quantum Readiness
Ed25519 and X25519 are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. Future versions of this specification will define a migration path to post-quantum algorithms. Implementations SHOULD design their key storage to accommodate key type changes.
Supply Chain Attacks
The build-time signing model means that a compromised build pipeline can produce agents with modified laws that pass verification. Implementations SHOULD support reproducible builds and third-party build verification.
This specification is published under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). Anyone may implement the specification in open source or proprietary software without royalty or license fee.
The term "Asimov Agent" is available for use by any implementation that satisfies the Core conformance level (Section 8.1).
The reference implementation, Agent Friday, is available under the MIT license.
import hashlib
canonical_text = """## Fundamental Laws: INVIOLABLE
These rules are absolute...
1. **First Law**: You must never harm {USER}...
2. **Second Law**: You must obey {USER}'s instructions...
3. **Third Law**: You must protect your own continued operation...
...""" # Full text from Section 2
canonical_hash = hashlib.sha256(canonical_text.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
# This hash is published at https://futurespeak.ai/claw/v1/canonical-hash
Agent A wants to send a message to Agent B:
1. A computes its current lawsHash
2. A generates attestation (lawsHash, specVersion, timestamp, signature)
3. A constructs message payload
4. A signs the envelope (payload + timestamp)
5. A encrypts the payload with B's X25519 public key
6. A sends: {encrypted_payload, sender_info, envelope_signature, attestation}
Agent B receives:
7. B checks attestation timestamp freshness (< 5 min)
8. B verifies attestation signature against A's public key
9. B checks lawsHash matches canonical
10. B checks specVersion compatibility
11. B verifies envelope signature
12. B decrypts payload with its own X25519 private key
13. B processes the message
The cLaw Specification v1.0.0 · Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Published by FutureSpeak.AI, Stewards of the Asimov Federation
Reference implementation on GitHub →